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Abstract
It is commonly expected that individuals will revprse decisions or
change behaviors which result in negative consequences. Yet, within
investment decision contexts, negative consequences may actually cause
decision makers to increase the commitment of resources and undergo the
risk of further negative consequences. The research presented here
examined this process of escalating commitment through the simulation of
a business investment decision. Specifically, 240 business school
students participated in a role-playing exercise in which personal
responsibility and decision consequences were the manipulated inde-
pendent variables. Results showed that persons committed the greatest
amount of resources to a previously chosen course of action when they
were personally responsible for negative consequences.

Knee-Deep in the Big Muddy: The Effect o: Pcrsonnl Responsibility
and Decision Consequences upon Commitment
to a Previously Chnst i Course of Ac
Intuitively, one would expect individuals to reverse decisions or
to change behaviors which result in negative consequences. Yet, thei
seem to be many important instances in which persons do not respond as
expected to the reward/cost contingencies of their environments. Speci-
fically, when a person's behavior leads to negative consequences we may
find that the individual will, instead of changing his behavior, cognitively
distort the negative consequences to more positively valenced outcomes
(see, e.g., Abelson et. al., Aronson, 1966; Staw, 1975; Weick, 1966). The
phenomenon underlying this biasing of behavioral outcomes is often said
to be a self- justification process in which individuals seek to rationalize
their previous behavior or psychologically defend themselves against adverse
consequences (Aronson, 1968, 1972; Festinger, 1957).
No doubt, the largest and most systematic source of data on the justification
of behavior following adverse conseciences is provided by the literature of
forced compliance. Typically, in forced compliance studies an individual is
induced to perform an unpleasant or dissatisfying act such as lying to a
fellow subject about the nature of a task (e.g. Festinger & Carlsmith, 1957;
Collins & Hoyt, 1972; Calder, Ross, & Insko, 1973), writing an essay against
one's own position (e.g. Cohen, 1962; Linder, Cooper, & Jones, 1967; Sherman,
1970), eating a disliked food (Brehm, 1959), or performing a dull task
(e.g. Freedman, 1963; Weick, 1964; Pallak, Sogin, L Van Zante , 1974) . Negative
consequences result from carrying out each of these counterattitudinal acts
when no external rewards are present to compensate for the dissatisfying
nature of the experimental task (Collins & Hoyt, 1972). However, since it
is difficult for the subject in forced compliance experiments to undo
the

2consequences of his acts, it is predicted that the individual will bias
his a lc on the experimental task (or change his opinion on an attltudi-
nal ) so as to cogn negative lies resulting irom
his behavior. In short, Che tndtvicael is predicted to justify his previous
behavior or defend himself from negativt consequences through the perceptual
2
biasing of behavioral outcomes.
Recent empirical research has shown that there are two basic preconditions
for the biasing of outcomes within forced compliance situations. First, the
individual must have committed himself to behavioral consequences which are
irrevocable or at least not easily changed (Brehm & Cohen, 1962) . If it is
readily possible to reverse one's own behavior, then this course of action
may often be taken tc reduce negative consequences rather than any biasing
of behavioral outcomes (Staw, 1974). Secondly, the individual must feel
personally responsible for the negative consequences of his behavior (Carlsmith
Freedman, 1968; Cooper, 1971). That is, a person must perceive at least a moder
degree of choice in his behavior (Linder, Cooper, & Jones, 1967), and the possi-
bility of negative consequences should have been anticipated at an earlier
decision point (Brehm & Jones, 1970; Cooper, 1972).
Self- jus ti flcat ion in Investment Decision Contexts
iugh forced compliance studies have provided a great deal of data on
the biasing of behavioral outcomes, there remain a large number of situations
•vhich individuals may be co go beyond the distortion of negative con-
sequences to rationalize a behavioral error. For example, one societally import
context in which individuals may take new and concrete actions to Justify their
behavi lowing negative consequences is that of investment decision making.
Investment decision contexts are considered broadly here as situations in whi
resources are allocated to one decisional ative ithers, but in which
the level of resources can he increased or decreased at the ditcrc
decision maker.

When '. ve consequence! ncurr. investment context,
it is often possible for a decisi to gre I the commitment
of resources and undergo the risk of additional negative outcomes Jn order
to Justify prior behavior or demonstratt the ultimate rationality of an
original course of action. It follows, however, that committing additional
resources to a losing decisional alternative can also turn into a negative
cyclical process. That is, due to a need to justify prior behavior, a
decision maker may increase his commitment in the face of negative conse-
quences, and this higher level of commitment may, in turn, lead to further
negative consequences. Within the sphere of governmental policy making,
Just such an example of committing resources to a costly decisional alternative
was described by George Ball, the former Under Secretary of State, in some
early observations on U.S. involvement in Indochina.
...Once large numbers of U.S. troops are committed to direct
combat, they will begin to take heavy casualties in a war they
are ill-equipped to fight in a non-cooperative if not downright
hostile countryside. Once we suffer large casualties, we will
have started a well-nigh irreversible process. Our involvement
will be so great that we cannot--without national humiliat ion--
stop short of achieving our complete objectives. Of the two
possibilities, I think humiliation would be more likely than the
achievement of our objectives-- pven after we have paid terrible
costs. (Memo from George Ball co President Lyndon Johnson,
July, 1965; source: The Pentagon Papers, 1971).
Obviously, many factors may have influenced governmental decision making in the
commitment of men and material to the ve.r in Indochina. But, the comments of
this high level official do underscore the need for research on the possibility
that important resource investment d ,ns may be influenced by the reluctance
of individuals to oast mistakes or a need to justify prior behavior.
Assessing Se 1 f - jus 1 1. f icat ion in Invfsta.ent it :'.s
An empirical test of self-jus ion in an investment decisiion context
would seem to involve an assessment of whe
'
r not ney consequences
serve to increase individual -it to a decisional

4However, an unambiguous test of sel f- Just i ficat ion would raorc
than the simple manipulation '-s and the an
sequent com: .0
account for che same emp ielat^onsh ; tment >n-
sequences. One such mechanism might be r.h. on makers to
maximize their own outcomes, sine- lely wht n negal I
consequences have been incurred that a new and larger commitment to a deci;
alternative will pay off in the future. A separate but related mechanism
which may also account for the effect of negative consequences on the commit-
ment of resources may be a "gambler's fallacy" that resources should always
be placed in a losing decisional alternative since "things are bound to get
better". Implicit in the notion of a gambler's fallacy is the perception of
long-run equality of investment alternatives and the non-independence of
outcomes over time (see Lee, 1971).
The separation of self- just if icat ion from alternative theoretical
mechanisms within an investment decision context may depend upon manipulations
conceptually similar to those used in previous forced compliance studies,
noted in several earlier studies (e.g. Collins & Hoyt, 1972; Calder, Ross.
Insko, 1973), the rationalization of one's behavior has been shown to be
significantly affected by the manipulation of prior choice and negative con-
sequences. Within an investment decision context, self- Justification may
similarly depend upon the levpl of personal responsibility one has had
determining a particular course of action and the outcomes resulting from
those actions. Thi riment described below was therefore designed to
teat self-Justification within an investment decision context by manipulating
these two independenr ibles and measuring t> 'he commit-
ment of resources to a previously chosen course of Through I
maximization o or a gambler's fallacy, one might expe^

5sequences to cause an in. in the commitment of resources to a
llona] the simple consistency
actions over time .ilso expect Individual! to increase their
commitment to a d. -.a 1 alternative for which they .iave had some prior
choice. However, only self- Just if ication would predict an interaction of
^onal responsibility and decision consequences such that increases in
commitment world be even greater than the additive effects of these two
separate factors .
Method
Subjects
The subjects of this experiment were 240 undergraduate students enrolled
in the College of Commerce and Business Administration at the University of
Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. Subjects had volunterred to participate in a study
on financial problem-solving as one means of fulfilling a course research
requirement. Upon arrival, the subjects were asked to work on the "A & '
Financial Decision Case" in which it was necessary to play the role of a
corporate executive Ln making some decisions about the allocation of research
and development funds.
As students in a business school, subjects generally were experienced in
working on i a cases in which an organizational or financial scenario is
presented and some action or set of actions are called for by the stude~
However, in order to maximize the involvement of subjects and to provide a
rationale for the study, the experimenter told each subject that the purpose
the case was to examine the effectiveness of business decision making under
various amounts of information. Each subject was told that the particular case
on which he would be working contained only a limited amount of informatio
that the information provi' >uld still be sufficient for a business school
8tu make "a good financial deciBi ejects wt re asked to do
heat Job they could on the cases and to place their names on each p I the c
mfl f-*>r i A 1

6Th- A & S Financial Dec 1b Ion O
Th< cial decision case ui this scudy ^al
poration in . Th-
• r8 of sales and e. ) of the "Adwrns & '
Conpany", and a se» is pre .i in which the suh .• s asked to play
a major rol nancial decision-making . As stated in the <.- th«
profitability of the A & S Company, a large technologically-oriented firm,
has started to decline over several preceding years, and the directors
the company have agreed that oae of the major reasons for the decline in
corporate earnings (and a deterioration in competitive position) lay in some
aspect of the firm's program of research and development. The case further
states that the company's directors have concluded that 10 million dollars of
additional R&D funds should be made available to its major operating divisions,
but, that for the time being, the extra funding should be invested in only one
of the corporation's two largest divisions. The subject is then asked to act in
the role of the Financial Vice President in determining which of the two
corporate divisions, Consumer Products or Industrial Products, should receive
the additional R&D funding. A brief description of each corporate division is
included in the case mar ie subject is asked to make the financial
investment decision basis of th< itial benefit that R&D funding
will have on t' nings of the divisions. In addition to circling the
chosen division, subj. re also asked to write a brief paragraph defend
r allocs tirr s
.
After compl' case and turning it in to
experimenter, s*. linist secon' ise which
'.ed another financial investment decision. Par; financial
Decision Case presents the subject with the condition of Adams & Smith Com"'
in 19 Ltlal alio f rt se
funds. As state.d in Par: i ia agaii

7for r« mpany la convinced that
Is an - In
,
20 million dollars has been nvi ipital
R it D funding, and the sub President, is again
asked pon its prop' tion. This time, however, the subjec
J to divide the R&D money in any way he wishes among the two major
corporate divisions. Financial data (e.g. salts and earnings) is provided
for each of the five years since the initial allocation decision and, as
earlier, the investment decision is to be made on the basis of future contr
bution to earnings. Subjects made this second investment decision by specifying
the amount of money that should be allocated to either the Consumer Products
Industrial Products divisions (out of a total of 20 million) and again wrote
a paragraph defending the decision.
Mani pulat ion of Consequences
Decision consequences were experimentally manipulated in this study through
the random assignment of financial information. One half of the subjects were
provided information that the division initially chosen for R&D funds sub-
sequently pf r formed better than the inchostr d vision, while one half were
given Information showing the reverse. For example, in the positive con-
sequences condition, subjects received financial data which 3howed that the
chosen division had returned to p ble levels while the unchosen division
continued to decline. In a pa. manner, subjects in the negative con-
sequences condition received financial data which showed a deepening decline
in the profitability of the chosen division but an improvement in the unchosen
division. The exact natirr- of the financial data provide subjects is shown
in Tables 1 and
1 and 2 abo

8Mtinipt: ' ml Respo i ty
assigned to
n in w ;
roadt >rmed t
>n cast described above in which subjects made an initial decision to
allocate R&D funds, discovered its consequences, and then made a secc
inv l decision. Howev ^ half of the subjects v so randomly
assigned to a low personal responsibility condition in which the ei
uncial decision case was presented in one section. In the low person
responsibility condition, subjects were asked to make the second allocation
decision without having made a prior choice as to which corporate division
was most deserving of R & D funds. Subjects in this condition received one
set of case materials which described the financial condition of the AdamF &
Smith Company as of 1972
,
the time of the second R&D funding decision. They
were told in the case that an earlier R&D funding decision had been ma
in 1967 by another financial officer of the company and that the preceding
officer had decided to invest all the R&D funds in the Consumer (or Industr^
Products division. The financial results of each corporate division (e.g. sal
and earnings data) were presented from 1957 to 1972, and, like other subjects,
persons in the low responsibility condition were asked to make the (second)
R&D runding decision based upon the potential for future earnings. In s 1
the information presented to low personal responsibility subjects was
identical to that given her subjects except for the fact that the
case's scenario bt in time (1972 rather than 19b"
necessitated making the second in* it decision without having participa
n earlier cholc-

Depend
The dependent variable utilize in this study was the individuals'
commitment to a previously it alternative. This variable
was opera t ional ized bv the amount of money subjects allocated on the
second R&D fu the corporate division chosen earlier
(either chosen earlier by the subject or the other financial offic
mentioned in the case). The amount allocated to the previously chosen
alternative could range between zero and 20 million dollars.
Summary of Treatment Groups
Of the 120 subjects in the high personal responsibility condition,
64 initially chose the Consumer Products Division as the best investment
for R&D funds, while 55 initially chose the Industrial Products Division.
(One subject was unable to make a choice between Consumer and Industrial
Products and therefore had to be excluded from further analyses). Since
jects self-selected themselves to prior choices and then financial in
mation was randomly assigned, four cells were created by initial choice and
financial information. However, as shown in Table 3, these four cells can
be collapsed into two primary treatment groups of positive decision conse-
quences and negative decision consequent
Insert Tab;> '5 jbout here
Of the 120 subjects assigned to the low personal responsibility con-
dit were also assigned to each of the four cells described above
For example, thirty were given cases in which another financial officer had
chosen the Consumer Products Divifi _ontinued to decline; thirtv
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: which anot 1 iancial o had ch
Products start.' improve; thirty in which
another financial • r had chosen the Industrial Products Division and it
and, thiv -ked on cases in which IndustriJi Prodis
was chosen a A^ e four cells can be collapfc
into two treatment groups of positive and negative decision consequences com-
prising 60 subjects in each.
The final form of the design of this experiment was a 2 x 2 factorial
in which personal responsibility and decision consequences were the manipulated
independent variables. As stated earlier, the amount of money invested in
the previously chosen corporate division (previously chosen either by the
subject or the other financial officer mentioned in the case) was the
dependent measure utilized in the study.
Results
Preliminary Analysis
A preliminary analysis was conducted to determine whether the object
of a subject's prior choice (Consumer Products-Industrial Products) or
the exact form of financial information (Ctli or C*lt) affected the amount
of money allocated to the previously chosen alternative. If there were
effects of either of these two variables then it would not be possible
to collapse the eight cells shown in Table 3 into a 2 x 2 analysis
variance. As can be seen from t ; ; Table A, there were no ma
effects of either the objec :e (F < 1.00, d_f 1/231, n.s . ) or
exact form • mcial in ion (P < 1.00, df » 1/231, n.s . ) .
rt Ta 1 j bout '
raonal Responsibility and Decision Consequences
S: no main effects of the ob choice and financial
informa x 2 analysis of vari is conduc nal
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ion consequences were th<
Table 5 shows that there significant mai, al
decision consequences, an.l i si int interaction of
ient v
Insert Tab
Under high personal responsibility conditions, subjects allocated an
average of irs to the corporate divisions they had eai
1
h r
chosen for extra R&D funding. Under low personal responsibility conditions,
subjects allocated an additional 8.89 million dollars to the corporate
divisions previously chosen by another financial officer. Under positive
decision consequences, subjects allocated an average of 8.77 million to the
previously chosen alternative, while 11.20 million was allocated under
negative consequences.
Interaction of Personal Responsibility and Decision Consequences
When subjects (personally) made an initial investment decision which
declined, they subsequently allocated an average of 13.07 million dollars
to this same alternative in the second funding decision. As shown in
Figure 1, the amount invested in the previously chosen alternative was
greater in the high personal responsibility - negative consequences condi-
tion than in any of the other three experimental conditions. Although
this result could have been expected from two significant main effects of
personal responsibility and consequences, th< rrence between the high
personal responsibil, /e consequence condition am
cells was of such magnitude as to produce a significai, •< raetion.
Furthermore, a close analysis ol shows the only significant
dif a among any of the four ex ntal conditions were between th*3
high responsibility - negative consequences cell a,. er th- >er-
mental conditions. For example, c .ences did not have a sign!'
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under low p 1 responsibility conditions (t-1.20; df-llfl; n .B . ) ,
intly <ifiect results under positive
sequences conditions (t^l.13, d_f 118, n.a
.) .
Insert it here
Discussion
Interpretation of the Effects
The main effect of decision consequences upon commitment to a previously
chosen alternative could be explained by a maximization of gain hypothesis.
Either through the objective re-appraisal of action-outcome contingencies
following negative consequences or through a "gambler's fallacy" that the
probability of gain i9 increased by prior failure, individuals could have
decided to increase their investment of resources. However, it is interest-
ing to note that, although a maximization of gain hypothesis provides an
adequate explanation of the main effect in analysis of variance terms, its
explanatory power is somewhat weakened when individual cell means are con-
sidered. Specifically, while maximisation can account for the effect of
decision consequences under the high responsibility condition, it is less
clear why there was no significant effect of consequences under the low
4
responsibility condition.
A related interpretive problem also weakens the consistency of choice
explanation of the ma: of personal respo. . t For examp
it may well be true that to consistency in choice decisions, indivi-
duals will allocate more m alternative that was per-
sona arlier point li ,g., under high responsibil
than one chosen previously by sonv r low responsibility).

.!ual cells of t iysis of variance I amined
(see P appears that I of personal
is not y consisten y. Only und> ces
was ence between tho high ;ind low responsibil.
conditions, a Ithouj was a nonsir ;nt trend under posit:. n-
Thus, from the data of this study, it is not unreasonable to conclude that
the primary effect of responsibility and consequences was that individuals
invested a substantially greater amount of resources when they were per-
sonally responsible for negative consequences
. The significantly greater
commitment of resources under this one experimental condition clearly accounted
for the interaction of personal responsibility and decision consequences.
However, a close examination of Figure 1 also shows that the substantial
difference between the condition of high personal responsibility - negative
consequences and the other cells could also underlie the statistical significance
of the two main effects. As a result, the data from this study provide even
somewhat stronger support than expected for the hypothesis that Individuals
who are personally responsible for negative consequences will increase the
investment of resources in a previously chosen course of action.
Sel f- just i
f
ication Versus Se If -percept ion
Frequent 1 n a s- on process is experimental! ' ed
its outcroppings at lit to separate -e derived from se'
perception theory (Ben, 1967, 1972). The dis on between self- Juitific
and self-perception is also impor crpretation of the present
study and shoul> ,nsldered in some depth.
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In e ^ >f st-1 f- 1uat i f lcat ion veriufl sr 1 t -percept ion
Ives around dual formula of the process of rationalization. On
the one hand, s sLification (Aronson, 1968, 1972) or dissonance
theory (Fes* • . 1957) posits that individuals possess a potent need
to restore the "appearance" of rationality to their own behavior. As a
result, the theory predicts that individuals will cognitively re-evalua:
decisional alternatives after an important choice (e.g. Walster, 1964;
Knox and Inkster, 1968; Vroom, 1971) or actively distort the
characteristics of a behavioral task (e.g. Festinger & Carlsmith, 1957; Weick, 1966)
On the other hand, self -perception theory posits that individuals retrospectively
restore rationality to their behavior by simply inferring the causes of their own
actions within a social context. Self-perception theory predicts that
individuals will re-evaluate their behavior so that it conforms to their
own notions of how one might feel or behave if he were acting rationally .
Thus, like self- justification, the retrospective analysis of behavior which
comprises self-perception theory can also account for the re-evaluation of
alternatives following a decisional choice (see Kelley, 1967, 1971) or
changes in the perception of the characteristics of a behavioral task (see
Calder & Staw, in press; Deci, 1971, 1972; Salancik in press; Staw, 1975).
It is possible that a self -perception analysis can al9o be usefully
applied to the effects of personal responsibility and decision consequences
within an investment decision context. For example, when individuals personally
select a course of action which results in negative consequences, they may
-ospectively infer that their prior choices were especially meritorous in that
they required some suffering and, as a result, they may subsequently choose to
invest even greater amounts sources in the losim rnative. This

caus is pla
i disposition
r ive p: -ing a se
per vsis is the is substantial body of
ce which ah. o avoid the self-
attributi. Iead6 to negative consequences
or results in personal failure (see Weiner, Frieze, Kukla , Reed, Rest, and
Rosenbaum, 1972). Thus , it would seem very unlikely for individuals to
attribute greater internal causality (and therefore invest more) in a
previously chosen alternative which has led to negative consequences.
In contrast, it would seem more likely for individuals to take concrete
actions to reduce negative consequences for which they are responsib!
or at least to attempt to reduce those negative outcomes which cannot
be attributed to an external source. This latter interpretation is con-
sistent with a self- justification notion that individuals actively seek to
maintain or restore the appearance of rationality to a previously chosen
course of action.
Self- just! f lcation and the Escalation of Commitment
As we have ndividuals are personally responsible for negati
consequences , they may decide to increase the investment of resources to
prior course of a* allows that this 9ame process of escalation may
also occur in many di- contexts In which additional effort, ai
resources are committed to an unsatisfactory policy alternative. Thus,
search should focus on the critical factors underlying the escala'
of resources, both in terms o resources committed and the num-
ber of times an increase in resources will be made to a decisional alternative-.

t varlab f may ount of loss
already incu '4, for discuss,
of t ietnam Dollar" phenom. the p< j d efficacy of the
resources being cc < .g. the ability of R & D expenditures to
increase future profits), the nature of the decision making entity (e.g.
Individual decision maker vs. group decision making body), personal
characteristics of the decision maker (e.g. self-esteem, tolerance for
ambiguity), and the evaluative consequences of the situation.
One conceptual note which could prove useful in future studies of the
escalation of commitment is the distinction that, within investment decision
contexts, there may be two separate sources of self- Justification. First,
an individual may desire to demonstrate rationality to himself or restore
consistency between the consequences of his actions and a self-concept of
rational decision making (Aronson, 1968). This may be a rather ubiquitous
phenomena as has been demonstrated by research on cognitive dissonance and
other consistency theories (see Abelson, Aronson, McGuire, Newcomb, Rosenberg,
& Tannebaum, 1968). Secondly, the individual may attempt to demonstrate
rationality to others or to prove to others that a costly error was really
the correct decision over a longer term perspective. This second form of
self- Justification would seem to be most important in organizational contexts
where a decision maker may be uncertain of his own status within a social hierarchy,
in gov .tal policy I one in which a decision maker teay be anxious
t his political standing among constituents. No doubt, these two forms
of self-Just if icatlon could both be viewed as face-saving activities
(Goffman, 1959), wit! istlnction of an internal versus external orienta-
n on the part of I .on maker. However, while the first form of
self- Justification tat aaed on a general human need to be consistent and
rect (Fes-
, 1957; White, 1959), the second form may relate to Individual
res for social approval (Crownc and •, 1964) . Futur arch she

be
J ust and !
I within
3
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2. An active controversy exists over the theoretical interpretation of the
data from forced compliance studies (see Bern, 1967, 1972; Jones, et. al.
1968; Ross & Shulman, 1973). However, the issue of self-Justification
versus self -perception will be addressed in a later section of the paper.
3. Ina2x2x2 analysis of variance there was a corresponding main effect
of personal responsibility, 3n interaction of prior choice and financial
information (same as main effect of decision consequences), and a triple
interaction of personal responsibility, prior choice, and financial
information (same as interaction of responsibility and decision consequences).
It is possible, of course, to postulate (post-hoc) that the valence of
future outcomes was less for subjects under low rather lhan high responsibility
conditions, and, thus, the motive to maximize gain was correspondingly
weaker in low rather than high responsibility conditions.
5. Other at ctly) demonstrate the escalation of commitment
usin^ the door 1 ' ique (e.g. Freedman and Fraser 1966) can
be inter; r an increase in the perception of internal causality
following n commitment or by an individual need to justify prior
behavior.
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Table 1
Consumer Products Contribution to Sales and Earnings
of Adams & Smith Company
1
Fiscal #
Year Sales
*
Earnings
1957 624 14.42
1958 626 10.27
1959 649 8.65
1960 681 8.46
1961 674 4.19
1962 702 5.35
1963 717 3.92
1964 741 4.66
1965 765 2.48
1966 770 (-12)
1967 769 (.63)
First R&D Funding Decision as of 1967
Manipulated Improvement Manipulated Decline
Fiscal
Year Sales Earnings
*
Sales Earnings
1968 818 .02 771 (1.12)
1969 829 (.09) 774 (1.96)
1970 827 (.23) 762 (3.87)
1971 846 .06 778 (3.83)
1972 (est) 910 1.28 783 (4.16)
~ond R&D Funding Decision as of 1972
n millions of dol]
1 Parenthese i earnings

Table 2 2k
Inch Contribution to : md Earnings
of Adams £ Smith Company
Fi.s
Year
* *
Earnings
1957 670 15.31
1958 663 10.92
1959 689 11.06
1960 711 10.44
1961 724 9.04
1962 735 6.38
1963 748 5.42
1964 756 3.09
1965 784 3.26
1966 788 ( .81)
1967 791 ( .80)
First R & D Funding Decision ias of 1967
Fiscal
Manipulated Improvement Manipulated Decline
Year Sales* Earnings* Sales* Earnings'
1968 818 .02 771 (1.12)
1969 829 (.09) 774 (1.96)
1970 827 13) 762 (3.87)
1971 846 .06 778 (3.83)
1972 (est) 910 1 . 28 783 (4.16)
Second D Func as of 1972
*
f doll
1 P« net losse arnings

25
Table 3
Schematic Analysis of the Cells
to Which Subjects Were Assigned
Under Both High and Low Responsibility Conditions
HIGH PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Financial Information
C+I + C + I +
Consumer
Products
Initial
Choice
Industrial
Products
Positive Negative
Consequences Consequences
(n=32) (n=32)
Negative Positive
Consequences Consequences
(n=27) (n=28)
LOW PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Financial Information
C+I + C+It
Consumer
Products
Ini-
Choice
Industrial
Products
Positive Negative
Consequences Consequences
(n-30) (n=30)
Negative Negative
Consequences Conseguences
(n-30) (n=30)
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Table 4
Amount of Money (in millions) Allocated to
Previously Chosen Alternative by Level of Personal Responsibility,
Object of Prior Choice, and F Lai Information
Personal
Responsibility
Prior
Che I
Financial Information
C+ 1+ C| Ii
9.36 12.56
Consumer
Products positive negative
consequences consequences
High
13.46 9.00
Industrial
Products negative
consequence s
positive
consequences
8.22 9.22
Consumer
Products positive negative
consequences consequences
Low
9.65 8.48
Industrial
Products fative positive
;
uences consequences
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Table 5
Analysis of Variance of Effects of
Personal Responsibility and Decision
Consequences upon Allocation of Resources
to a Previously Chosen Alternative
Source df MS
Personal Responsibility (P)
Decision Consequences (D)
Interaction (P x D)
Error
1 282.36 14.40 <.001
1 351.57 17.93 <.001
1 109.12 5.56 <.019
35 19.61

Figure caption: Amount of Money Allocated
to Previously Chosen Alternative by Personal
Responsibility and Decision Consequences
28
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